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Abstract
Past empirical research on monetary policy in open economies has
found evidence of the ’delayed overshooting’, the ’forward discount’
and the ’exchange rate’ puzzles. We revisit the effects of monetary pol-
icy on exchange rates by applying Uhlig’s (2005) identification proce-
dure that involves sign restrictions on the impulse responses of selected
variables. We impose no restrictions on the exchange rate to leave
the key question as open as possible. The sign restriction methodol-
ogy avoids the “price puzzles” of the identification strategies used by
Eichenbaum-Evans (1995) and by Grilli-Roubini (1995, 1996), which
are particularly pronounced, when using an updated data set. We find
that the puzzles regarding the exchange rates are still there, but that
the quantitative features are different. In response to US monetary
policy shocks, the peak appreciation happens during the first year af-
ter the shock for the US-German and the US-UK pair, and during
the first two years for the US-Japan pair. This is consirably quicker
than the three-year horizon found by Eichenbaum-Evans. There is a
robust forward discount puzzle implying a large risk premium. We
study this issue, introducing and calculating conditional Sharpe ra-
tios for a Bayesian investor investing in a hedged position following
a US monetary policy shock. For foreign monetary policy shocks, we
find more robust results than with the Grilli-Roubini recursive iden-
tification strategy: the posterior distribution regarding the exchange
reaction looks rather similar across countries and VAR specifications.
In particular, we find that there seems to be considerable uncertainty
regarding the initial reaction of the exchange rate. Quantitatively,
monetary policy shocks seem to have a minor impact on exchange
rate fluctuations.
Keywords: vector autoregressions, agnostic identification, forward dis-
count bias puzzle, exchange rate puzzle, exchange rates, monetary policy
JEL codes: C32, E58, F31, F42
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1 Introduction
What are the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates? According to
conventional wisdom, there is a sharp conflict between baseline theory and
baseline evidence. Dornbusch’s (1976) well known overshooting hypothesis
predicts that an increase in domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest
rates leads to an impact appreciation followed by a persistent depreciation
of the domestic currency.
Empirical studies have found different results, however. The most suc-
cessful studies have followed the lead of Sims (1972, 1980), employing vector
autoregressions to study these issues in order to sort out the issues of causal-
ity of monetary policy shocks. Among the advantages of this methodology
is the possibility to cleanly formulate and understand the impact of policy
changes without violations of the Lucas’ critique, see Sims (1982, 1986).
For the issue of the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates, e.g.
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995, 1996) employ
recursive identification and find a persistent appreciation for periods up to
three years, in contrast to theory. Also Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) find
this result for their larger specifications, although it is not the main focus
there. This finding is known as the ’delayed overshooting puzzle’, see fig-
ure 1. In particular, this implies a violation of the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) condition, and is therefore also often called the ’forward discount puz-
zle’, see figure 2. Note that there may be a forward discount puzzle even
without delayed overshooting. Moreover, monetary contractions in the sev-
eral G-7 countries lead to an impact depreciation or, at least, no significant
appreciation of their currencies relative to the US dollar (Sims, 1992, Grilli
and Roubini 1995, 1996). This is known as the ’exchange rate puzzle’, see
figure 3. In addition, the quantitative effect of monetary policy on exchange
rates is far from being clear. The estimated percentages of exchange rate
fluctuations due to monetary policy shocks range between 5 and 60 percent,
see Clarida and Gali (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Rogers (1999),
Faust and Rogers (2000) and Kim and Roubini (2000).
Recently, this conventional view has come under attack. Most notably,
Faust and Rogers (2003) argue, that one needs to “relax dubious identifying
assumptions stemming from e.g. recursive identification and impose at most
rather mild sign restrictions or shape restrictions a priori in order to draw
robust conclusions about the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange
rates. They find that no robust conclusions can be drawn regarding the
timing of the peak response of the exchange rate, that there is robust evidence
in favor of large deviations from UIP due to monetary policy shocks (see
figure 2) and that monetary policy shocks may or may not be a cause of
exchange rate volatility.
Indeed, we shall see that the identification strategies proposed by Eichen-
baum and Evans or by Grilli and Roubini lead to significant ”price puzzles”
when applied to an updated data set, furthermore calling their original results
into questions.
This paper reexamines these issues. We identify monetary policy shocks,
using the approach of Uhlig (2005) of imposing sign restrictions on impulse
response functions. In particular, we assume that domestic contractionary
monetary policy shocks do not lead to decreases in domestic short-term in-
terest rates, increases in domestic prices and increases in domestic monetary
aggregates. Hence, we match the conventional wisdom and avoid the price as
well as the liquidity puzzle by construction. Crucially, we do not impose any
restrictions on the exchange rate to leave the central question as open as pos-
sible. We argue that these sign restrictions are plausible because they most
directly reflect what economists have in mind (or how economists informally
evaluate empirical results) when thinking about monetary policy shocks.
We view this as the continued pursuit of the agenda of Sims (1980).
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There, he has argued against the large-scale models popular at that time
by stating that “the connection between ... models and reality - the style in
which ’identification’ is achieved for these models - is inappropriate, to the
point at which claims for identification in these models cannot be taken seri-
ously.” The advantage of reduced-form vector autoregressions is that it does
not need these incredible identification restrictions at all, but for structural
vector autoregressions, some identification for the structural shocks is obvi-
ously needed. In line with the quote by Sims, we believe that some of the
work using structural VARs similarly are in the danger of employing identifi-
cation restrictions which are not a priori plausible, while the sign restriction
approach allows a much more direct connection with believes derived from
theory and the empirical application.
We thus follow the lead of Faust and Rogers (2003), who likewise use sign
restrictions to narrow down the set of reasonable identifications for monetary
policy shocks. In contrast to these authors, we view the sign restrictions as
a means to identifying monetary policy shocks rather than an aid in ro-
bustness analysis. Most of the Faust-Rogers restrictions are on-impact only,
complemented with very few and hand-selected extra sign restrictions at later
horizons. By contrast, we impose sign restrictions on the impulse responses
for key monetary policy variables for several periods after the shock. We
view this as plausible. For example, to implement the benchmark view that
inflation slows down after a monetary tightening, an on-impact drop in prices
followed by a much larger subsequent rise ought to be ruled out as a possible
response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. This is exactly what we
do here. Thereby, we can narrow down the range of possible monetary policy
shocks considerably, as has already been argued in Uhligs (1998) discussion
of Faust (1998), and indeed this will turn out to be true here as well. On
the other hand, we do not impose Faust-Rogers-type shape restrictions that
“the exchange rate response falls between lags 1-2,2-3,3-4,4-6,6-12,12-18,18-
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36,18-80”. Rather we wish to leave the response of the exchange rate as
agnostically open as possible, since that is the variable of focus.
Following the arguments of Sims and Uhlig (1991), we use a thoroughly
Bayesian procedure. Thus, we provide posterior distributions regarding the
parameters of interests - like the time and the size of the peak response -
rather than robust 90 percent coverage bands. The sign restrictions imposed
take center stage in this paper, as they are key to identification and should be
subjected to debate and scrutiny. We also exploit this Bayesian perspective
to ask questions concerning the risk a Bayesian investor faces when betting
on the UIP violations in 2. We calculate an implied Sharpe ratio and compare
it to Sharpe ratios conventionally observed on e.g. equity markets.
As a benchmark and similar to Faust and Rogers (2003), we apply our
identification method to the VAR specifications used by Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995, 1996). When using conventional
identification methods increasing the number of variables in a VAR implies
a rising number of assumptions which become increasingly difficult to jus-
tify. Adding possibly important variables, while using identification via sign
restrictions, is typically rather straightforward, however: thus we do.
Analyzing the US-German, the US-UK and the US-Japanese bilateral ex-
change rates, we now avoid the price puzzles of Eichenbaum-Evans or Grilli-
Roubini by construction. Nonetheless, the delayed overshooting puzzle and
the forward discount as well as the exchange rate puzzles are still there and
they are sizeable. However, the quantitative features are different. The peak
appreciation happens during the first year after the shock for the US-German
and the US-UK pair, and during the first two years for the US-Japan pair.
This is consirably faster than the three-year horizon found by Eichenbaum-
Evans. The forward discount bias puzzle comes with risk. The implied
Sharpe ratio for a Bayesian investor can be as high as 2.5, which is five times
as high as the annual Sharpe ratio for US stock markets. The exchange rate
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puzzle becomes more robust than with the Grilli-Roubini recursive identifica-
tion strategy. Quantitatively, monetary policy shocks seem to have a minor
impact on exchange rate fluctuations, which is in contrast to some findings
of the previous literature.
We view these results as reconfirming a modified version of the findings
of Eichenbaum-Evans and Grilli-Roubini. In essence, their recursive identi-
fication strategy was close to correctly identifiying monetary policy shocks
with the data set they used then, even though that identification strategy no
longer seems sensible with an updated data set. Thus, the puzzling behaviour
of exchange rates is a feature of monetary policy shocks, once correctly iden-
tified. The results of Faust and Rogers (2003) are not in contrast with our
results: however, their restrictions are too weak to narrow down the range of
reasonable monetary policy shocks sufficiently, thus underscoring the point
raised in Uhligs (1998) discussion of Faust (1998).
The identification method used in this paper, introduced by Uhlig (2005),
builds on the classic paper by Leamer (1981) and its macroeconomic imple-
mentation by Blanchard (1989) and is related to work by Canova and Pina
(1999) and Canova and de Nicolo (2000) who put sign restrictions on impulse
response correlations. Like in Bernanke and Mihov (1998) the method con-
centrates on identifying only the shock of interest rather than aiming at fully
identifying the system. Other papers that impose restrictions on impulse
responses are Dwyer (1997), Faust (1998) and Gambetti (1999).
A number of papers in the empirical literature concerning monetary policy
in open economies employ structural VAR approaches to identify monetary
policy shocks instead of using a recursive ordering as Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995), Grilli and Roubini (1995, 1996) and Sims (1992) do. E.g. Kim
and Roubini (2000) model reaction functions of the monetary authorities
and the structure of the economy while Clarida and Gali (1994), Lee and
Chinn (1997) and Rogers (1999) use the Blanchard-Quah decomposition, i.e.
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they distinguish between permanent and transitory effects to identify shocks.
Kim (2001) experiments with recursive as well as non-recursive identification
schemes to analyze the international transmission of US monetary policy
shocks.
In the theoretical literature concerning monetary policy in open economy
settings there are attempts to rationalize the forward discount puzzle. E.g.
Gourinchas and Tornell (1996, 2002) explain the delayed overshooting as
the interaction of learning about the current state and the intrinsic dynamic
response of interest rates to monetary shocks. Studies like e.g. Alvarez,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2002, 2003), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), or
Kollmann (1999) use dynamic general equilibrium models with monetary
shocks to explain the behavior of the exchange rate. We complement this
literature by introducing and empirically calculating conditional Sharpe ra-
tios for a Bayesian investor investing in a hedged position following a US
monetary policy shock.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After providing a theoretical
framework in section 2, section 3 describes our empirical approach. Section
4 reports the results and, finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Exchange Rates andMonetary Policy: Some
Theory and an Asset Pricing Perspective
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) and the Dornbusch overshooting model are
explained well in e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), sections 8.2.7 and 9.2.
Here, we just provide a brief summary in order to fix notation and to provide
a framework for the empirical analysis to follow, complementing both with
an asset pricing perspective.
Importantly and as has also been emphasized by Faust and Rogers (2003),
we do not consider UIP and the overshooting hypothesis in general, but only
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conditional on a monetary policy shock. A key question is: how much of a
change or deviation from UIP should one expect following a monetary policy
shock?
Thus, let sk be the impulse response of the log of the exchange rate,
understood throughout the paper to be Dollars (“home”) per unit of non-US
(“foreign”) currency. Let ik and i
∗
k be the impulse response for the US and
the foreign short term rates, respectively. This allows the calculation of the
compounded return from investing (or borrowing) at this rate from 0 to k,
i0→k =
k−1∑
j=0
ij, i
∗
0→k =
k−1∑
j=0
i∗j
Define the forward discount premium
ρk = s0 − sk + i0→k − i
∗
0→k
which is the gain due to the monetary policy shock (compared to the baseline
scenario without that shock) from borrowing foreign currency for the k peri-
ods following the monetary policy shock at the foreign short rate, exchanging
it for Dollars, investing it at the US rate, and exchanging it back again in
period k. Note that one can write
ρk =
k∑
j=1
ξj
where
ξj = sj−1 − sj + ij−1 − i
∗
j−1
is the same gain when executing this hedging strategy only from periods
j − 1 to j following the shock. In particular, ρj stays flat for j ≥ j
∗, if
ξj = 0 for j ≥ j
∗. Note furthermore, that the reaction s0 in the impact
period is not part of the foreign discount premium, i.e., we assume that the
investor starts the investment strategy after observing the monetary policy
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shock and the concurrent on-impact movement of the exchange rate. The
investment strategy examined here relies on predictable movements, and not
on reacting more quickly than the foreign exchange market to news about
monetary policy. Put differently, as long as an investor starts this investment
strategy within the “impact month” of the monetary policy shock, he will
receive ρk.
(Conditional) uncovered interest parity in the context of our analysis
says that one should not be able to make (or loose) money via these hedging
strategies, i.e. ρk ≡ 0 for all k or ξj ≡ 0 for all j. This appears to be in
conflict with the evidence found in the literature, see figure 2.
The forward discount puzzle is rarely stated in these terms, though, (with
Faust and Rogers (2003), being one notable exception. Rather, the forward
discount puzzle is an implication of the observations on delayed overshooting.
Let p∗k and pk be the impulse responses of the log price levels in the foreign
country resp. in the US, and let
qk = sk + (p
∗
k − pk) (1)
be the impulse response of the real exchange rate. The Dornbusch (1976)
overshooting model results from adding to (conditional) UIP the assump-
tions, that the impulse response for the long run real exchange rate qk will
converge to zero, qk → 0 due to long run purchasing power parity, that prices
are sticky and that the differences in the short rates ij − i
∗
j slowly reverts to
zero following the initial monetary policy shock characterized by a liquidity
effect i0 − i
∗
0 > 0. I.e., under these assumptions, q0 should be large and
negative and slowly revert back to zero and the domestic currency should
appreciate on impact. However, the empirical literature has found delayed
overshooting in response to US monetary policy contraction, see figure 1 and
no significant foreign-currency appreciation or even foreign-currency depre-
ciation in response to a foreign monetary policy contraction, see 3.
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There are a couple of things to note at this point. First, the Dornbusch
overshooting hypothesis requires a number of auxiliary assumptions beyond
conditional UIP. Second, even if there is overshooting, conditional UIP might
be violated if the quantitative magnitudes do not satisfy 1.
Second, the hedging strategies described above are conditional on a single
monetary policy shock only. To literally execute such a strategy in practice,
where one wishes to only exploit possible gains from a single monetary policy
shock, one would need to ”insure” away all other influences such as other
contemporaneous and all future shocks until maturity k.
Third and perhaps most importantly: while many papers in the literature
- including Faust and Rogers (2003) - have documented (explicitely or im-
plicitely) significant violations of conditional UIP, this may not suffice for an
investor contemplating exploiting this deviation at some date t. The hedging
position executed for a single dollar at stake is a random variable with payoff
in terms of US goods given by
Xt+k = (1− e
ρk)e(i0→k+p0−pk) (2)
if executed in the “hypothetical” manner of insuring against all other shocks.
Think of Xt+k as a component of a portfolio bearing exchange rate risk due
to a monetary policy shock. Our aim is to study the price for the risk of this
component in isolation.
Let emt,t+k be the stochastic discount factor of this investor between t and
t+ k. Standard asset pricing theory implies that
0 = Et[e
mt,t+kXt+k]
Compare this with the general problem of short-selling any Dollar-denominated
asset upon the occurrence of a monetary policy shock at date t, and invest-
ing the proceeds at the short rate i0→k. Let the random return of that asset
between period t and t+ k be given by R˜t+k, and let ρ˜t+k = i0→k − log R˜t+k
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be the log excess return. As above, the payoff to this strategy is
X˜t+k = (1− e
ρ˜t+k)e(i0→k+p0−pk)
and the asset pricing equation reads
0 = Et[e
mt,t+kX˜t+k] (3)
Let
µρ˜ = logEt[e
ρ˜t+k ]
be the logarithm of the expected excess return. Let
r0→k = i0→k + p0 − pk
be the real short rate. The asset pricing equation (3) can be rewritten as
SRρ˜,k ≡
µρ˜
σρ˜
= −corrt(mt,t+k, ρ˜t+k)σm − corrt(r0→k, ρ˜t+k)σr0→k (4)
where corrt(·, ·) denotes conditional correlation, where σm, σρ˜ and σr0→k are
the conditional standard deviations of mt,t+k, ρ˜t+k and r0→k. This equation
defines the Sharpe ratio SRρ˜,k, expressed in terms of log returns. For equity
(and the reverse of the strategy described here, i.e. for going long on equity
and borrowing at the short rate) and an investment horizon of one year,
Sharpe ratios of 0.3 to 0.5 are common, as is well-known from the literature.
For a discussion in the context of DSGE models, see e.g. Uhlig (2004).
We thus evaluate the Sharpe ratio SRρ,k for the hedging strategy ρk from
the perspective of a Bayesian investor, who is able to “insure” against all
other current and future shocks, but remains uncertain about the precise
impact of monetary policy shocks on the forward discount premium due to
uncertainty regarding the reduced-form dynamics of the economy as well as
uncertainty regarding the precise nature of monetary policy shocks.
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3 Our Approach
3.1 Methodology
Consider a vector autoregression in reduced form,
Yt = B(L)Yt−1 + ut, E[utu
′
t] = Σ
for some vector of variables Yt, coefficient matrices B(L) and a variance-
covariance matrix for the one-step ahead prediction error Σ. The key to
identification is to represent the one-step ahead prediction error ut as a linear
combination of orthogonalized “structural” shocks,
ut = Avt, E[utu
′
t] = I
Traditional identification strategies impose a recursive ordering or structural
restrictions on A or A−1. Here, we use the methodology of sign restrictions
as in Uhlig (2005).
As a consequence, it is not necessary to identify all structural shocks.
Identifying a single shock is equivalent to identifying an impulse vector:
Definition 1 The vector a ∈ Rm is called an impulse vector, iff there is
some matrix A, so that AA′ = Σ and so that a is a column vector of A.
Simple matrix algebra shows that any impulse vector a can be character-
ized by
a = A˜α, (5)
where A˜A˜′ = Σ is some decomposition of Σ and α is an m-dimensional vector
of unit length. Let ri(k) ∈ R
m be the vector response at horizon k to the i-th
shock in a Cholesky-decomposition of Σ. Then, the impulse response ra(k)
for a is given by
ra(k) =
∞∑
i=1
αi ri(k). (6)
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The identifying restrictions we shall impose to identify an impulse vector
characterizing monetary policy shocks are that (ra(k))j ≥ 0, j ∈ J+ and
(ra(k))j ≤ 0, j ∈ J− for some subsets of variables J+ and J− and some
horizon k = 0, . . . , K.
We use a Bayesian prior for the reduced form VAR parameters (B,Σ) and
an independent uniform prior for α. The uniform prior for α assures that
the implied prior for a is independent of the specific decomposition A˜A˜′ = Σ
of Σ and can even be random, as long as the choice of the decomposition is
independent of α.
A Bayesian VAR with 6 lags in levels of the logs of the series has been
fitted to the data except for using interest rates directly. No constant or
time trend are included. The choice of 6 lags follows the choices made in
the literature1. The prior and therefore the posterior belong to the Normal-
Wishart family, see Uhlig (1994) for a detailed discussion of the properties.
Results are obtained by taking draws from the posterior for the VAR coef-
ficients B and draws from the space of possible impulse vectors. Inference
statements are based on those joint draws that satisfy the sign restrictions
for the impulse responses. We use 500 draws satisfying the restrictions for
drawing posterior inferences. We typically show the median as well as the
16% and 84% quantiles of the distribution for the points on the impulse
response functions.
For further methodological details, see Uhlig (2005).
3.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in Open
Economies
The first choice to be made is the selection of variables. To assure compa-
rability and similar to Faust and Rogers (2003), we shall use the specifica-
1In fact, much of the evidence becomes considerably weaker, when using 12 lags instead,
which we did in a previous version of this paper.
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tions used by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) as well as Grilli and Roubini
(1995, 1996). Both specifications investigate countries pairwise, e.g. the
US and Germany or the US and the UK. Typical monetary policy variables
like short term interest rates and price levels are included, as are data on
industrial production and the exchange rate.
The advantage of the Eichenbaum-Evans or EE specification is the in-
clusion of the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves as a monetary
aggregate, which a number of researchers have argued to be closely related to
monetary policy choices, see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Stron-
gin (1995). The advantage of the Grilli-Roubini or GR specification is that
it treats the US and the “foreign” country in a more symmetric manner,
since typically data on reserves are not available to the same extent for the
“foreign” countries.
When using conventional identification methods including more variables
implies a rising number of assumptions which become increasingly difficult
to justify. The advantage of identification via sign restrictions is that we do
not need many more assumptions. Hence, in a second step, we study the
robustness of our results and extend both benchmark VAR specifications by
adding possibly important variables, and analyze the resulting BIG VAR.
We study three country pairs: the US and Germany, the US and the
UK, and the US and Japan. We employ monthly data from 1975.07 to
2002.07. For a detailed description of the variables and the specifications,
see appendix 6.1.
To identify monetary policy shocks we shall impose that domestic price
variables as well as monetary aggregates like the the ratio of nonborrowed
to total reserves or the money stock do not rise. Thus, “price puzzles” are
avoided by construction. We do not impose a sign restriction on the reaction
of industrial production, since the results in Uhlig (2005) suggest that there
is little evidence that GDP will fall in reaction to a contractionary monetary
13
US monetary policy shock:
Specification EE BIG
Variables y, y∗, p, nbrx, y, y∗, p, p∗, m, m∗,
i, i∗, s i, i∗, s, r, r∗, nbrx
Restrictions: p ≤ 0, p ≤ 0, m ≤ 0,
nbrx ≤ 0, i ≥ 0 nbrx ≤ 0, i ≥ 0
foreign monetary policy shock:
Specification: GR BIG
Variables: y, y∗, p, p∗, y, y∗, p, p∗, m, m∗,
i, i∗, s i, i∗, s, r, r∗, nbrx
Restrictions: p∗ ≤ 0, p∗ ≤ 0, m∗ ≤ 0
i∗ − i ≥ 0 i∗ − i ≥ 0
Table 1: Identification of Monetary Policy shocks.
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policy shock.
We furthermore either impose that interest rates do not fall or, alterna-
tively, impose that they do not fall more than the interest rate in the other
country. These two choices reflect two prototypes of the game played be-
tween the two monetary authorities. Consider a surprise rise in the interest
rate of some country A of interest, which may be contemporaneous with a
surprise rise of interest rates in some other country B. With the first inter-
pretation, one can think of the central bank of country A as a Stackelberg
leader: if both interest rates go up, then it and not necessarily the central
bank of country B was the ultimate cause. In the second, the central bank
of country A is viewed as a follower: deviations from the interest rate set by
the other central bank of country B are viewed as the key surprise, to which
the central bank in country A reacts quickly.
In principle, the game played between two monetary authorities could
be rather complicated. There is really no good reason to a priori rule out
e.g. a game in which central banks alternate as to who is using the higher
interest rate. And it is easy to think of considerably more complicated games.
We view the two possibilities investigated here as two particularly plausible
benchmarks. To impose the commonly held view that US monetary policy
is leading and other countries are following, we shall impose the restriction
i ≥ 0 when identifying US monetary policy shocks, but i∗ − i ≥ 0, when
identifying foreign monetary policy shocks. For the BIG VAR, one can also
think of these choices as reflecting a causal ordering of the monetary policy
choices, with the US ordered first. The identification restrictions imposed
are summarized in table 1.
For the restriction horizon, we have used k = 0, . . . , K = 11, i.e. one
year, throughout. Choosing shorter restriction leaves too much room for
spurious effects, while imposing a longer horizon imposes an implausibly
long duration for the liquidity effect. Uhlig (2005) contains some discussions
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how results vary when applying the methodology to the analysis of monetary
policy shocks in US data. There, output seems to rise rather than fall, if the
restriction horizon is extended to one or even two years. This turns out to be
even more forcefully true here. It might be interesting to understand more
deeply, why this might be the case, but that discussion would be beyond
the scope of this paper. We therefore have chosen to omit results for other
choices for K.
4 Results
4.1 US Monetary Policy Shocks
For a US monetary policy shock, figure 4 contains the key results, while
figures 5 to 13 contain further details.
We have plotted all the impulse response functions for our benchmark
identification in figure 5 (two pages). The vertical lines in some of the impulse
response diagrams denote the sign restrictions we have imposed. Note that
- by construction - there is no liquidity puzzle and no price puzzle. In line
with Uhlig (2005), we find no significant effect on real output. We believe
that these are reasonable looking results, and shall thus turn to a discussion
of the results regarding the exchange rate response.
The first line of figure 4 shows the impulse response of the real exchange
rate to a US monetary policy contraction and should be compared to figure 1.
The second line shows the posterior distribution of the peak appreciation,
i.e. the distribution for the month containing the lowest point of an impulse
response drawn from the posterior and shown in the first line. The posterior
distribution for e.g. the peak of nominal exchange rate appreciation is very
similar to the posterior for the peak of the real exchange rate appreciation:
we therefore concentrate on the real exchange rate only.
The results show that the US-German and US-UK bilateral real exchange
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rates appreciate until approximately the forth to twelfth month and then
depreciates in our benchmark identification. The delay is slightly shorter for
Germany than for the UK, and considerably longer in the US-Japan case,
with most of the distribution centered around months 8 to 24. Our results
suggest that there is evidence of a delayed overshooting, in contrast to Kim
and Roubini (2000) and Faust and Rogers (2003), but that the delay is
considerably shorter than the three-year horizon found by Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995). The delay is a matter of months, not a matter of years.
It could be that the posterior distribution for the peak months gives
misleading results, if e.g. impulse responses showing mild appreciations peak
early and those with strong appreciations peak late. That this is not the
case can be seen from the posterior joint distributions of the peak and its
altitude both for the real and the nominal exchange rate in figure 6. The
joint distribution is shown both for the first five years as well as for the first
24 months. Also, the distribution of the beyond-impact change of the real
exchange rate q(k)−q(0) is shown. Apparently, the posterior is rather sharply
peaked for the US-Germany and the US-UK case. It is rather remarkable
that there is a sharp peak in the posterior distribution for the change of the
exchange rate compared to the on-impact response, i.e. for q(k) − q(0) for
the US-Germany and the US-UK pair, with greater diffusion in the US-Japan
case. After the on-impact change, the exchange rate drops by a further one
percent for US-Germany within 7 months and for the US-UK within 2 to 5
months. There is also considerable mass on this event in the US-Japan case,
but there is additional mass on early and mild as well as late and somewhat
stronger additional appreciations.
Figure 7 compares the impulse response functions for the three identifi-
cations we investigated, namely the two sign restriction identifications in the
EE and the BIG specification as well as the original recursive Eichenbaum-
Evans identification in the EE specification. There is only a minor difference
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between the result of the EE and BIG specification, showing that our results
are fairly robust and the identification method indeed easily generalizable,
as claimed above. Also, the evidence looks rather similar across the three
country pairs. The difference to the results from the Eichenbaum-Evans
identification is considerable, though.
The reason for this difference can be understood from figure 8 (two pages),
where we have compared all the impulse response functions for the variables
of the EE specification in the US-UK case. Note in particular the huge price
puzzle emerging for the Eichenbaum-Evans identification. This price puzzle
is considerably more pronounced than in the original source, because the re-
cursive identification procedures have been applied here to our updated data
set, using data from 1975 to 2002. We believe that this strong and long posi-
tive reaction of the price level casts considerable doubt on this identification
strategy and therefore on the results for the exchange rate response (and we
doubt that Eichenbaum and Evans would have stuck to this strategy in light
of the new data and the new results). Obviously, there are additional impulse
response functions for the BIG specification and similar comparisons could
be made for the US-Germany and the US-Japan case. We show the impulse
responses for the BIG specification in figure 13 (two pages). These do not
change the key insights, however.
The third and forth line of figure 4 shows the impulse response for the
forward discount premium and the resulting Sharpe ratio for a Bayesian in-
vestor. A comparison for our three identification procedures can be found
in figures 9 and 10. The impulse response for the forward premium should
be compared to the theory figure 2. The results can be described as follows.
There is a forward discount premium, but there is also considerable uncer-
tainty regarding its size or whether it is even positive. When taking this
uncertainty into account and calculating the Sharpe ratio, one finds values
between 1 and all the way up to 2.5 for the EE specification and investment
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horizons for up to two years and values around 0.5 to 1.7 for the BIG specifi-
cation, due to the additional posterior coefficient uncertainty. The results are
quite a bit higher for the Eichenbaum-Evans recursive identification: there,
the Sharpe ratio reaches values near 4 before slowly moving back to zero.
We do not view the recursive identification as plausible for this updated data
set, however, as we have argued before2. We therefore conclude, that there is
indeed a sizeable forward discount bias puzzle, offering rewards to risk which
exceed the corresponding annual US stock market Sharpe ratio by a factor
of up to 5, but that the reward for risk is not quite as extreme as suggested
by the recursive identification by Eichenbaum and Evans.
We similarly investigate the forward premium ξk for one-month holding
periods in figure 11 and the corresponding Sharpe ratios in figure 12. The
numbers are very similar, and thus do not change the insights.
We conclude from this that the reward for the risk of betting on violations
of the uncovered interest parity is higher by a factor but not by an order of
magnitude, compared to Sharpe ratios typically calculated for asset markets.
It may be puzzling why financial markets offer such a high reward for risk in
general. While the market for foreign exchange offers even higher rewards,
it is not drastically different from other asset markets in that respect.
The last line of figure 4 concerns the variance decomposition of the move-
ments of exchange rates: we shall discuss this together with the variance
contributed by foreign monetary policy shocks in subsection 4.3 .
2Nonetheless one may wonder, which types of shock are the cause of these reactions.
There must be some shocks which generate these kinds of high Sharpe ratios. Here we
only argue, that they are not shocks to monetary policy. If they are due to e.g. restric-
tions of capital movements or changes in taxation, these high Sharpe ratios may not be
“exploitable” for smart investors. Investigating this issue further is surely interesting but
beyond the scope of this paper.
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4.2 Foreign Monetary Policy Shocks
For a foreign monetary policy shock, figure 14 contains the key results, while
figures 15 to 20 contain further details.
The first line of figure 14 shows the impulse response of the real exchange
rate and should be compared to the theory picture 3. The second line shows
the posterior probability for that impulse response function to be positive in
any given month. The results for nominal and real exchange rates are very
similar throughout: we thus only show the latter.
The results show that, again, there is a gradual response only, i.e. a
delayed overshooting, and that there is considerable probability for the ex-
change rate to appreciate rather than depreciate on impact. The results here
are rather robust across countries. This is in contrast to Grilli and Roubini
(1995, 1996) who find the exchange rate puzzle for Germany but not for the
UK.
Figure 15 compares the response of the real exchange rates for the sign
restriction approach in theGR as well as the BIG specification to the results
from the recursive Grilli-Roubini identification. The Grilli-Roubini identifi-
cation leads to very different results, depending on the country pair, whereas
the results for the sign restriction approach look considerably more alike.
Figures 16 and 17 provide further comparisons betweenGR and the origi-
nal Grilli-Roubini identification on the distribution of the sign of the response
for the real exchange rate as well as the price level. For our specification and
on impact, the posterior probability for a positive exchange rate response is
somewhere between 30% and 60%. This probability then rises and plateaus
somewhere near 70% to 90% within three years. There is more variation
in the results regarding the sign distribution for the original Grilli-Roubini
identification. There also is a considerably large price puzzle. We believe
that this shows the advantage of using the sign restriction methodology as
opposed to their original identification strategy, when applying it to this
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updated data set.
Figure 18 compares the impulse responses of all the variables (and vari-
ables derived from it) for the three specification and the US-UK pair: we
have actually chosen the pair which should be most favorable to the Grilli-
Roubini identification, based on the rather orthodox looking results of the
third line in figure 15. Note again, however, that there is a huge price puzzle
for the Grilli-Roubini identification: foreign prices keep on rising for a long
time before returning to zero, following a contractionary foreign monetary
policy shock. For our sign restriction approach, this price puzzle is avoided
by construction.
There are more impulse response functions available for the sign restric-
tion approach both for the GR and the BIG specification. They are shown
in figures 19 as well as 20 (two pages) for completeness and to emphasize,
that our identification strategy is reasonable.
The last line of figure 14 concerns the variance decomposition of the
movements of exchange rates, which we discuss next in subsection 4.3.
4.3 Monetary Policy Shocks and Exchange Rate Volatil-
ity
Figure 21 contains the variance decomposition for the exchange rate move-
ments explained by a US monetary policy shock, while figure 22 contains
the fraction of exchange rate variation explained by foreign monetary policy
shocks.
US monetary policy shocks account for somewhere between 2 and 10
percent of the exchange rate fluctuations at the median estimate, independent
of the horizon and country, for both sign restriction specifications. The
number is smaller at most horizon for the Eichenbaum-Evans identification
except for a rather sharp peak 6 to 8 months after the shock.
For foreign monetary policy shocks, figure 22 delivers a similar result with
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a somewhat broader range for the numbers. The Grilli-Roubini specification
delivers very different results, depending on the country pair chosen: less
than 5 percent (at the median) is explained in the US-German case, nearly
30 percent is explained at a horizon one to three years out in the US-UK
case and there is a sharp peak one year out in the US-Japan case.
These rather different behaviours for the Grilli-Roubinin specifications
as well as the sharp peaks in the Eichenbaum-Evans specifications may be
viewed as a further odity, when applying these conventional identification
strategies, which are avoided with the sign restriction approach.
For the sign restriction approach, the 86% quantile rarely moves beyond
30% for any country or specification. When considering the joint contribution
of both monetary policy shocks the median estimate ranges between 10 and
20 percent, and the 86% quantile reaches up to 45 percent of the exchange
rate movements.
All in all, our results are in contrast to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
who estimated a percentage of 42, 26 and 23 for Germany, UK and Japan
at lags 31− 36. Other examples for studies which find that monetary shocks
have a substantial contribution in explaining real exchange rate fluctuations
are Clarida and Gali (1994) and Rogers (1999). Our result that monetary
policy shocks do not seem to be important for exchange rate fluctuations
is compatible with the weaker result of Faust and Rogers (2003) who state
that the percentage might be anything between 8 and 56. However, since we
are imposing more identifying assumptions, we find a narrower range than
they do. Our results are also compatible with Kim and Roubini (2000) who
estimate a percentage of 5, 16 and 17 at long horizons.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has estimated the effects of monetary policy shocks on the US-
German, the US-UK and the US-Japanese bilateral exchange rates by ap-
plying an agnostic identification method recently proposed by Uhlig (2005).
A priori theorizing has been made explicit by imposing sign restrictions on
the impulse responses of selected variables for a certain period following the
shock. We view this identification strategy as a consequent pursuit of the
agenda put forth by Sims (1980) of avoiding incredible identifying restric-
tions. In particular, we impose no or only weak restrictions on the exchange
rate to leave the key questions as open as possible.
We have followed conventional wisdom and have assumed that domestic
contractionary monetary policy shocks do not lead to decreases in domes-
tic short-term interest rates, increases in domestic prices and increases in
domestic monetary measures.
It has turned out that the evidence on the delayed overshooting, the
forward discount and the exchange rate puzzles remain, but that their quan-
titative properties change. Applying our identification scheme to a bench-
mark VAR we have found that with 2/3 probability the US-German and the
US-UK exchange rates appreciate for about 9 months and then depreciate.
Only the US-Japanese exchange rate shows a delayed overshooting up to 24
months.
Regarding the forward discount puzzle, we evaluate the risk inherent in
exploiting the forward discount premium by calculating the Sharpe ratio for a
Bayesian investor, and find considerably higher but not dramatically different
from those found on asset markets. We do find a robust exchange rate puzzle,
in the sense that there is a rather a stable and inconclusive pattern across
several countries and specifications, in contrast to the results from standard
identification procedures. Quantitatively, monetary policy shocks seem to
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have a minor impact on exchange rate fluctuations, again in contrast to
some of the literature.
Our results are sharper than the results of Faust and Rogers (2003) who
find that the behavior of the exchange rate is very sensitive to different iden-
tification schemes. The sharpening is due to imposing more (and we argue,
sensible) identifiying restrictions compared to the rather loose on-impact re-
strictions in Faust and Rogers. In contrast to these authors, we do not re-
strict the reaction of the exchange rate, though, and view our methodology
as providing posterior distributions, rather than a sensitivity analysis.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data
variable description source
y index of US industrial production IMF Washington,
line 66
p US consumer price index IMF Washington,
line 64
nbrx US non-borrowed reserves/total reserves Fed. Reserve Bank
St. Louis
m US money supply M1 Fed. Reserve Bank
St. Louis
i US 3-months treasury bill rate IMF Washington,
line 60c
r US 10-year government bond yield IMF Washington,
line 61
y∗ foreign industrial production IMF Washington
line 66
m∗ foreign money supply M1 (UK: M0) IMF Washington,
line 39, (UK: Bank of England)
p∗ foreign consumer price index IMF Washington,
line 64
i∗ foreign 3-months treasury bill rate IMF Washington,
line 60c
r∗ foreign 10-year government bond yield IMF Washington,
line 61
s nominal exchange rate in dollar Fed. Reserve Bank
per foreign currency St. Louis
q real exchange rate derived
per foreign currency
ρ forward discount premium derived
(accumulated)
ξ forward discount premium derived
(for one period)
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6.2 Specifications
The following VAR specifications have been used:
EE (Eichenbaum-Evans): y, y∗, p, nbrx, i, i∗, s
GR (Grilli-Roubini): y, y∗, p, p∗, i, i∗, y
BIG (big VAR specification:) y, y∗, p, p∗, m, m∗, nbrx, i, i∗, r, r∗, s
6.3 Identifications in the Literature
The following is a short description of some of the identifications used in the
literature
Eichenbaum-Evans: Eichenbaum and Evans assume the recursive ordering
[y, p, y∗, i∗, nbrx, i, s]. A US monetary policy contraction is identified
with a fall in nbrx.
Grilli-Roubini: Grilli and Roubini assume a recursive ordering [y∗, p∗, y, p, i, i∗, s].
A foreign monetary policy contraction is identified with a rise in the
foreign short term interest rate.
Faust-Rogers: Faust and Rogers consider the EE specification and analyze
the impact of a monetary innovation. Two sets of restrictions are as-
sumed. The first set consists of money restrictions: on impact p, y, y∗,
nbrx, s are larger than or equal to zero and i and i∗ are less than or
equal to zero; p at horizon 80 is not larger than at horizon 36; y∗ is
no more than one-half of that of y on impact and the decline in i∗ is
not larger than one-half of the decline in i on impact. The second set
consists of shape restrictions on the exchange rate: the exchange rate
responses falls between lags 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-6, 6-12, 12-18, 18-36, 18-80.
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Faust and Rogers report results under three combinations of these re-
strictions: money restrictions only, money and shape restrictions, and
neither money or shape restrictions.
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6.4 Figures
6.4.1 Theory
33
years
0
321
Evidence: Eichenbaum-Evans (1995)
Theory: Dornbusch (1976)
Response to US monetary
policy contraction:
$
$/
/
q
P P
=
ƒ
ƒ
(real 
exchange
rate)
Figure 1: A stylized representation of the forward discount puzzle
k: years after shock
0
321
Evidence: EE (1995), 
Faust-Rogers (2003)
Theory: UIP
Response to US monetary
policy contraction:
$
0 0
($ / ($ /
k
k kr r
ρ =
−
+ −
0 k
ƒ
→ →
ƒ) ƒ)
(forward
discount
premium)
Figure 2: A stylized representation of the forward discount puzzle
years
0
321
Evidence: Grilli-Roubini (1996)
Theory: Dornbusch (1976)
Response to foreign monetary
policy contraction:
$
$/
/
q
P P
=
ƒ
ƒ
(real 
exchange
rate)
Figure 3: A stylized representation of the exchange rate puzzle
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6.4.2 Responses to a US Monetary Policy Contraction.
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Figure 4: Key results for a US monetary policy shock, using the bench-
mark identification in the EE specification. Shown are the results for the
response of the real exchange rate q, the posterior distribution for its peak,
the response of the (accumulated) forward premium, the Sharpe ratio of a
Bayesian investor and the variance decomposition of the nominal exchange
rate.
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Figure 5: Part 1 of the impulse responses for a US monetary policy contrac-
tion, using the benchmark identification for the EE specification. Note that
there is little difference between the response of the nominal and the real
exchange rates.
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Figure 5 continued. Part 2 of the impulse responses for a US monetary policy
contraction, using the benchmark identification in the EE specification.
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Figure 6: Real exchange rate q. Posterior distribution for the size and
location of the peak appreciation q(k) as well as for the change relative to
the impact reaction q(k) − q(0), conditional on a US monetary policy con-
traction, for the benchmark identification, EE VAR. The left column shows
the distribution over the first 20 quarters, whereas the other two columns
use a monthly scale for a closer examination of the first 24 months.
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Figure 7: Impulse response function for the real exchange rate, conditional on
a US monetary policy contraction. We compare the benchmark specification
identification in the EE VAR specification to the identification in the BIG
VAR to the original Eichenbaum-Evans recursive identification.
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Figure 8: Comparison of results. For a US monetary policy contraction and
the US-UK country pair, we compare the benchmark identification in EE to
the BIG specification and the original identification of Eichenbaum-Evans.
Note the “price puzzle” in the Eichenbaum-Evans column.
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Figure 8 continued. Part 2 of the comparison.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses for the forward discount premium ρk, conditional
on a US monetary policy contraction.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses for the Sharpe ratio of a Bayesian investor,
conditional on a US monetary policy contraction.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses for the forward discount premium ξk for a one-
month arbitrage strategy from periods k − 1 to k after a contractionary US
monetary policy shock.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses for the Sharpe ratio for one-period arbitrage
trades ξk between k − 1 and k of a Bayesian investor, conditional on a US
monetary policy contraction.
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Figure 13: This figure shows impulse responses to a US monetary policy
contraction for the BIG VAR, using K = 11.
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Figure 13, impulse responses to US monetary policy contraction for the BIG
VAR, continued.
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6.4.3 Responses to a Foreign Monetary Policy Contraction
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Variance decomposition for s, nom. exch.rate:
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Figure 14: Key results for a foreign monetary policy contraction, using
the benchmark identification with i∗− i ≥ 0 in the GR specification. Shown
are the results for the response of the real exchange rate q, the posterior
distribution for its sign distribution and the variance decomposition for the
nominal exchange rate.
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Figure 15: Impulse response function of the real exchange rate, conditional
on a foreign monetary policy contraction. We compare the benchmark iden-
tification and imposing i∗ − i ≥ 0 in the GR VAR specification to the BIG
VAR specification as well as the recursive Grilli-Roubini identification.
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Figure 16: Distribution for the sign q ≥ 0 of the real exchange rate, condi-
tional on a foreign monetary policy contraction. We compare the benchmark
identification and imposing i∗ − i ≥ 0 in the GR VAR specification to the
BIG VAR specification as well as the recursive Grilli-Roubini identification.
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Figure 17: Impulse response function of the price level, conditional on a
foreign monetary policy contraction. We compare the benchmark identifica-
tion and imposing i∗ − i ≥ 0 in the GR VAR specification to the recursive
Grilli-Roubini identification. Note that there is a considerable price puzzle
in the Grilli-Roubini specification, which is avoided with sign restrictions by
construction.
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Figure 18: Comparison of results. For a foreign monetary policy contraction
and the US-UK country pair, we compare the benchmark identification in
the GR specification to the original identification of Grilli-Roubini.
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Figure 19: Impulse responses to a foreign monetary policy contraction in the
GR VAR, using the restriction i∗ − i ≥ 0.
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Figure 20: Impulse responses to a foreign monetary contraction. Identifica-
tion and i∗ − i ≥ 0 for the BIG VAR.
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Figure 20, impulse responses to a foreign monetary contraction for the BIG
VAR, continued.
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6.4.4 Variance Decompositions
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Figure 21: Variance decompositions: the contribution of US monetary policy
shocks to the variance of the nominal exchange rate.
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Figure 22: Variance decompositions: the contribution of foreign monetary
policy shocks to the variance of the nominal exchange rate.
57
 SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
001 "Nonparametric Risk Management with Generalized 
Hyperbolic Distributions" by Ying Chen, Wolfgang Härdle and 
Seok-Oh Jeong, January 2005. 
002 "Selecting Comparables for the Valuation of the European 
Firms" by Ingolf Dittmann and Christian Weiner, February 
2005. 
003 "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-sided 
Commitment" by Dirk Krueger and Harald Uhlig, February 
2005. 
004 "Value-at-Risk Calculations with Time Varying Copulae" by 
Enzo Giacomini and Wolfgang Härdle, February 2005. 
005 "An Optimal Stopping Problem in a Diffusion-type Model with 
Delay" by Pavel V. Gapeev and Markus Reiß, February 2005. 
006 "Conditional and Dynamic Convex Risk Measures" by Kai 
Detlefsen and Giacomo Scandolo, February 2005. 
007 "Implied Trinomial Trees" by Pavel Čížek and Karel 
Komorád, February 2005. 
008 "Stable Distributions" by Szymon Borak, Wolfgang Härdle 
and Rafal Weron, February 2005. 
009 "Predicting Bankruptcy with Support Vector Machines" by 
Wolfgang Härdle, Rouslan A. Moro and Dorothea Schäfer, 
February 2005. 
010 "Working with the XQC" by Wolfgang Härdle and Heiko 
Lehmann, February 2005. 
011 "FFT Based Option Pricing" by Szymon Borak, Kai Detlefsen 
and Wolfgang Härdle, February 2005. 
012 "Common Functional Implied Volatility Analysis" by Michal 
Benko and Wolfgang Härdle, February 2005. 
013 "Nonparametric Productivity Analysis" by Wolfgang Härdle 
and Seok-Oh Jeong, March 2005. 
014 "Are Eastern European Countries Catching Up? Time Series 
Evidence for Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland" by Ralf 
Brüggemann and Carsten Trenkler, March 2005. 
015 "Robust Estimation of Dimension Reduction Space" by Pavel 
Čížek and Wolfgang Härdle, March 2005. 
016 "Common Functional Component Modelling" by Alois Kneip 
and Michal Benko, March 2005. 
017 "A Two State Model for Noise-induced Resonance in Bistable 
Systems with Delay" by Markus Fischer and Peter Imkeller, 
March 2005. 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 018 "Yxilon – a Modular Open-source Statistical Programming 
Language" by Sigbert Klinke, Uwe Ziegenhagen and Yuval 
Guri, March 2005. 
019 "Arbitrage-free Smoothing of the Implied Volatility Surface" 
by Matthias R. Fengler, March 2005. 
020 "A Dynamic Semiparametric Factor Model for Implied 
Volatility String Dynamics" by Matthias R. Fengler, Wolfgang 
Härdle and Enno Mammen, March 2005. 
021 "Dynamics of State Price Densities" by Wolfgang Härdle and 
Zdeněk Hlávka, March 2005. 
022 "DSFM fitting of Implied Volatility Surfaces" by Szymon 
Borak, Matthias R. Fengler and Wolfgang Härdle, March 
2005. 
023 "Towards a Monthly Business Cycle Chronology for the Euro 
Area" by Emanuel Mönch and Harald Uhlig, April 2005. 
024 "Modeling the FIBOR/EURIBOR Swap Term Structure: An 
Empirical Approach" by Oliver Blaskowitz, Helmut Herwartz 
and Gonzalo de Cadenas Santiago, April 2005. 
025 "Duality Theory for Optimal Investments under Model 
Uncertainty" by Alexander Schied and Ching-Tang Wu, April 
2005. 
026 "Projection Pursuit For Exploratory Supervised Classification" 
by Eun-Kyung Lee, Dianne Cook, Sigbert Klinke and Thomas 
Lumley, May 2005. 
027 "Money Demand and Macroeconomic Stability Revisited" by 
Andreas Schabert and Christian Stoltenberg, May 2005. 
028 "A Market Basket Analysis Conducted with a Multivariate 
Logit Model" by Yasemin Boztuğ and Lutz Hildebrandt, May 
2005. 
029 "Utility Duality under Additional Information: Conditional 
Measures versus Filtration Enlargements" by Stefan 
Ankirchner, May 2005. 
030 "The Shannon Information of Filtrations and the Additional 
Logarithmic Utility of Insiders" by Stefan Ankirchner, Steffen 
Dereich and Peter Imkeller, May 2005. 
031 "Does Temporary Agency Work Provide a Stepping Stone to 
Regular Employment?" by Michael Kvasnicka, May 2005. 
032 "Working Time as an Investment? – The Effects of Unpaid 
Overtime on Wages, Promotions and Layoffs" by Silke 
Anger, June 2005. 
033 "Notes on an Endogenous Growth Model with two Capital 
Stocks II: The Stochastic Case" by Dirk Bethmann, June 
2005. 
034 "Skill Mismatch in Equilibrium Unemployment" by Ronald 
Bachmann, June 2005. 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 035 "Uncovered Interest Rate Parity and the Expectations 
Hypothesis of the Term Structure: Empirical Results for the 
U.S. and Europe" by Ralf Brüggemann and Helmut 
Lütkepohl, April 2005. 
036 "Getting Used to Risks: Reference Dependence and Risk 
Inclusion" by Astrid Matthey, May 2005. 
037 "New Evidence on the Puzzles. Results from Agnostic 
Identification on Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates." by 
Almuth Scholl and Harald Uhlig, July 2005. 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
